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Abstract 
Why do some self-determination movements manage to achieve autonomy, while others fail 
to extract such salient concessions during peace negotiations? Although one would expect 
supporters of the self-determination movement to unite in their struggle against the 
incumbent regime, recent literature has demonstrated that they tend to fight each other just 
as often as they fight the government in their competition for political relevance. Yet, little 
has been done to explain the effects such infighting has on the peace negotiations. Based on 
the comparison of the cases of Southern Sudan and Darfur, this study shows that more 
cohesive movements are able to extract much more salient concessions that address the 
conflict’s master cleavage and reflect the characteristics of a club good. The findings further 
suggest that fragmented movements tend to be paid off rather than yielded to by the 
incumbent government, thus rendering the achievement of peace utterly unattainable. 
Future research will have to examine whether these findings hold an explanatory power in 
contexts outside of Sudan. 
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I. Introduction 
“…the war, like the country, was not one,  
but many: a violent ecosystem capable  
of generating endless new things to fight about  
without ever shedding any of the old ones” 
- Deborah Scroggins, Journalist (2004) 
Ending violence in civil wars is usually quite difficult. Putting an end to the war itself is even 
more so. Since the end of World War II civil wars have taken a dominant position in the 
typology of armed conflicts. In terms of sheer volume, civil wars have been about three 
times as frequent as interstate wars in that period (Christia, 2008). Not only are civil wars 
significant in their quantity, but they also tend to be persistent and recurrent, resulting in 
cycles of protracted violence and mutinies (Seymour, Forthcoming). Numerous factors 
increase the difficulties associated with reaching a negotiated agreement in civil wars, 
including issue indivisibility, power asymmetries, opposing identities, information problems, 
and spoilers. Moreover, the complexity of civil war settlement is further explained by the 
simultaneous presence of what Kalyvas (2003) calls ‘master cleavage’, the overarching 
grievance on which the conflict is based, its dominant discourse, alongside numerous and 
diverse underlying causes – local and private cleavages – which are often either completely 
or partially unrelated to the master cleavage. These Byzantine complexities of the micro-level 
civil war dynamics obfuscate our understanding of civil wars and limit the scholarly research 
agenda.  
In the past, research had focused on the non-state side in civil wars as a unitary actor. 
Recent works, however, have shifted their focus towards a more detailed, micro-level 
examination of non-state actors, concentrating on inter-rebel fragmentation as an important 
variable in itself. The multitude of actors caused by inter-rebel fragmentation tends to 
complicate the negotiation process, significantly extending its length (D. E. Cunningham, 
2006) and making the achievement of an implementable agreement close to impossible. The 
logic suggests that stronger, more unified rebel movements seeking self-determination and 
posing a bigger challenge to the incumbent government in terms of material resources and 
bargaining power, would be able to force the concessions from the government more 
frequently than the weaker, more fragmented movements with numerous individual factions. 
However, the reality suggests otherwise. Why, then, do we observe smaller ethnic factions of 
the movement receive significantly more concessions than the unified ones? Is there 
anything about the types of the concessions they receive that makes them more attractive to 
the individual factions, but not the bigger movement itself? This study aims at addressing 
these issues in the context of an ethnic self-determination movement by examining the 
following question: How does fragmentation affect the types of concessions made by the incumbent 
government to the rebel factions in the civil war peace negotiations? Based on the comparison of two 
cases of violent conflict in Sudan, that of Southern Sudan and Darfur, I will argue that the 
more cohesive movements are able to extract concessions related to the shared overarching 
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goal of the movements, reflected by the characteristics of a club good. More fragmented 
movements, however, tend to be able to receive payoffs, or private goods, as their 
concessions form the incumbent regime. 
Apart from its theoretical importance, the effects fragmentation may have on the types of 
concessions the rebel movement receives in the course of civil wars have major practical and 
policy implications. Firstly, understanding the range of acceptable outcomes before the start 
of negotiations has significant affects on the willingness of the parties to come together for 
negotiations. Additionally, it affects their use of tactics during the bargaining process. Such 
understanding is essential for the successful civil war settlement through negotiations, rather 
than the use of violence. Secondly, the knowledge of the motives driving the choices at the 
bargaining table are a necessary attribute for future successful implementation of the 
negotiated agreements, regardless of the nature of the internal conflict. Therefore, a more 
thorough examination of fragmentation, negotiation outcomes and their relation to the 
conflict’s master cleavage allows for better policy instruments to be used in conflict 
termination and transformation. If we are to understand the conditions under which civil 
wars can be terminated, it is crucial that we probe into the motivations behind the processes 
that take them there. 
The next chapter represents a review of relevant literature, followed by the theoretical 
framework in chapter 3 and research design in chapter 4. Chapters 5 and 6 will focus on the 
analysis of the two cases followed by the discussion of the cross-case analysis and alternative 
explanations in chapter 7. The last chapter will conclude the findings and suggest possible 
avenues for future research. 
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II. Literature Review 
In the past, the standard approach to the study of civil wars had been focusing on civil war 
duration (Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000; Fearon, 2004), onset (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; 
Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Harff & Gurr, 2004; Petersen, 2002; Posen, 1993; Toft, 2003), 
termination (Hartzell, 1999; Kaufmann, 1996a, 1996b; Licklider, 1993; Sambanis, 2000; 
Stedman, 1997; Walter, 1997), recruitment patterns  (Arjona and Kalyvas 2004; Humphreys 
and Weinstein 2006) and the role of ethnicity (Brubaker & Laitin, 1998; Kalyvas, 2003; 
Kaufmann, 1996a; Petersen, 2002; Sambanis, 2000), especially in relation to the ethnic 
nature of civil wars in 1990s. The main focus of the literature on civil wars has, therefore, 
been the state- and country-level attributes, much less focused on the non-state side. The 
most influential large-N research of violence in civil wars tends to ignore the fragmentation 
within non-state actors whatsoever (such as Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 
2003). Such a focus has led to a failure to grasp the complexity of internal inter-rebel and 
rebel-state interactions. Recently, the scholarly interest has started to regard non-state actors 
not as coherent and unitary challengers of the state, but rather as a shifting set of actors with 
a shared central identity, yet malleable allegiances and commonly divergent interests (Bakke 
et al., 2012; Pearlman & Cunningham, 2012). Such malleable alliances and often conflicting 
interests, which represent the division other than the conflict’s ‘master cleavage’ (Kalyvas, 
2003), can explain much of the violence in the civil conflicts that is attributed to the non-
state actors infighting. Such violence is often associated with the inter-rebel fragmentation. 
However, violence is not the only aspect of a conflict that is affected by these internal 
conflict dynamics. 
Recent literature points to the central role that fragmentation plays in civil wars. A number 
of studies have investigated the link between fragmentation and the durability and likelihood 
of peace agreements (Atlas & Licklider, 1999; D. E. Cunningham, 2006; Johnston, 2007; 
Nilsson, 2008), violence onset (Lawrence, 2010; Pearlman, 2008), its targets and types 
(Weinstein, 2007), and various organizational properties in rebel groups (Gates, 2002; 
Kenny, 2010; Sinno, 2010; Staniland, 2009). Often missing, however, is an account of 
whether and how fragmentation influences peace negotiations as such, and whether it has an 
effect on the types of agreements signed, regardless of their aims, be they ending violence per 
se or terminating civil wars. I will, therefore, first review the literature on the effects of rebel 
fragmentation, and then move on to the discussion of existing literature on peace 
negotiations in civil wars in relation to fragmentation and concessions. 
Fragmentation 
Among the existing studies that have moved beyond the assumption of a unitary non-state 
opposition side with homogenous preferences are those that mainly examine the use of 
violence by rebels, their strategic interaction with local communities and government’s 
forces (K. G. Cunningham, Bakke, & Seymour, 2012; Fjelde & Nilsson, 2012; Kalyvas, 2006, 
2008; Stedman, 1997; Varshney, 2003; Weinstein, 2007); governmental approach towards 
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fragmented groups and conflict resolution (Driscoll, 2012); alliance formation (Bapat & 
Bond, 2012; Nygard & Weintraub, Forthcoming) and spoiling behavior (Greenhill & Major, 
2007; A. H. Kydd & Walter, 2002; Stedman, 1997). A few quantitative studies have begun to 
examine the effects of fragmentation on the dynamics of civil wars, underlying the “complex 
and ambiguous processes” of constant realignments between and within groups (Kalyvas, 
2003: 475). One of the effects of such rebel group fragmentation is increased violence 
between the rebel groups and civilians due to the competition for resources and political 
relevance (K. G. Cunningham et al., 2012; Nygard & Weintraub, Forthcoming). K.G. 
Cunningham et al. (2012) point to the pattern of violence escalation due to the increase of 
the number of factions within the non-state groups (competition) and, thus, increased 
incentives to use riskier tactics. Fragmented rebel groups, they find, tend to use more 
violence in their struggle against the state than more cohesive groups. Moreover, the use of 
violence by these fragmented movements is not only directed at the state-side, but is often 
associated with civilians, and is used in various forms including rape, kidnapping of children 
to be used as soldiers or slaves, looting and razing villages (C. Metelits, 2009). 
Logic suggests that instead of spending time and resources fighting each other and the 
civilians, rebel groups could benefit from increased chances of extracting concessions from 
an incumbent government, enhanced joint military and financial capabilities, and, thus, 
maximization of wartime returns through alliance formation. However, the examples of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, and Myanmar illustrate that instead of creating 
coalitions, rebel groups fight one another for control over lootable resources, loyalty of 
civilians, and access to strategically important territory (Fjelde & Nilsson, 2012). In the 
Liberian context, such fighting between 1991 and 1992 resulted in around 2,000 fatalities 
(Sundberg, Eck, & Kreutz, 2012). What then prevents rebel groups from forming alliances, 
which would make them a much more powerful enemy on the battlefield as much as at the 
bargaining table (D. E. Cunningham, 2006)?  
Recent studies that have looked at alliance formation in civil wars have identified an 
important mechanism that prevents alliance formation – the commitment problem (K. G. 
Cunningham, 2011; Driscoll, 2012; Fearon & Laitin, 2007; Furtado, 2007; Nygard & 
Weintraub, Forthcoming; Walter, 1997). One way of looking at how commitment problem 
is applicable to alliance formation is the possibility of exploitation of the allies once the 
coalition is formed (Bapat & Bond, 2012). The lack of ‘good’ reputation and transparent 
structures, raising trustworthiness issues, prevents rebel groups from trusting each other “to 
form credible commitments” (Bapat & Bond, 2012). However, large-scale counterinsurgency 
operations force groups with relatively symmetric goals and asymmetric resource 
endowments to overcome the commitment problem in the face of an immediate threat 
(Furtado, 2007). Not only does the commitment problem complicate alliance formation 
within the non-state actors, but it also prevents rebel groups from negotiating with the 
government, since they do not trust the government to comply with the policy concessions 
and follow through with the agreement (Fearon & Laitin, 2007). Rebel groups themselves 
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frequently appear to be incapable of credible commitments due to the internal rebel 
fragmentation, rendering peace settlements much more difficult to achieve (D. E. 
Cunningham, 2006; Driscoll, 2012) and providing incentives for the state to act in the logic 
of ‘divide-and-rule’, e.g. fragmenting the rebel factions to make individual ones less 
significant (K. G. Cunningham, 2011). 
Such a pattern points to the need to look beneath the conflict’s master cleavage in order to 
understand the motives of individual actors’ behavior in peace negotiations and the effects 
fragmentation has on the types of concessions rebel groups are able to force out of the 
government. While an emerging body of literature is focused on different causes and effects 
of rebel group fragmentation (Bakke et al., 2012; D. E. Cunningham, 2006; K. G. 
Cunningham et al., 2012; K. G. Cunningham, 2013; Driscoll, 2012; Findley & Rudloff, 2012; 
C. M. Metelits, 2009; Pearlman & Cunningham, 2012; Pearlman, 2008; Seymour, 
Forthcoming), its effects on the negotiation outcomes, and especially concessions, are less 
well-researched. Next section presents an overview of the existing literature on the effects of 
fragmentation on peace negotiations in general, and the role of concessions in particular.  
The Effects of Fragmentation on Peace Negotiations and Concessions 
Existing literature that looks into peace negotiations through the lens of fragmentation tends 
to focus on several main factors: commitment problems and credible guarantee (Bapat & 
Bond, 2012; D. E. Cunningham, 2006; Driscoll, 2012; Walter, 1997), veto players and 
difficulty of reaching compromises (D. E. Cunningham, 2006; Driscoll, 2012; Gurr, 2000; 
Nygard & Weintraub, Forthcoming), the role of concessions, especially as a tactic to limit 
the number of opponents (K. G. Cunningham et al., 2012; K. G. Cunningham, 2011) and 
the relative power distribution among the negotiating parties (Driscoll, 2012; J. Zartman, 
2008). The problem of credible guarantee (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Walter, 1997, 2002) is 
especially relevant for fragmented rebel groups, as their leaders cannot credibly commit to 
peace within the groups themselves, as well as to the state, providing the government with 
incentives to use violence instead. In fact, commitment problems within the rebel groups are 
as difficult to resolve as is the war’s master cleavage (Kalyvas, 2003). However, some argue 
that when facing an immediate threat of counterinsurgent actions from the state, rebel 
groups have incentives to form coalitions, thus overcoming the commitment problem and 
allowing for less chaotic peace negotiations (Bapat & Bond, 2012; Driscoll, 2012). 
Nonetheless, Walter (1997) states that another way to resolve a conflict with the problem of 
credible guarantee is third-party involvement in peace negotiations and enforcement. Such 
an argument is further supported by Bapat & Bond, as they discuss the logic of sponsorship1 
as an enforcement mechanism when rebels are faced with a powerful government (Bapat & 
                                            
1Bapat & Bond (2012) define “a state sponsor using Byman’s definition in Deadly Connections, which states that 
a sponsor is a state that provides intentional assistance to a terrorist group to help it use violence, bolster its 
political activities or sustain the organization.” 
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Bond, 2012). The sponsor then becomes a guarantor of credibility, improving rebels’ 
bargaining position. 
Existing literature tends to agree that the multitude of actors, so-called ‘veto players’, 
complicates the negotiation dynamics and prolongs the efforts (D. E. Cunningham, 2006; 
Nygard & Weintraub, Forthcoming). The reasons for extended negotiations in conflicts with 
a multitude of actors are the smaller bargaining range of acceptable agreements due to the 
diverging preferences, acute information asymmetries, incentives to hold out on the 
agreement to ensure a better deal, and constantly shifting alliances (D. E. Cunningham, 
2006; Nygard & Weintraub, Forthcoming). However, when negotiations break down, the 
fighting resumes, thus imposing additional costs to be borne by all parties until either a 
military defeat or another round of negotiations. Thus, fragmentation of rebel movements 
tends to prolong the duration of a conflict quite significantly, which has an effect on how 
the concessions are perceived and made. 
The strategic use of concessions as a negotiation tactic is an important variable in peace 
negotiations with multiple parties. K. G. Cunningham (2011) argues that fragmented rebel 
groups receive concessions at a higher rate than cohesive unitary groups, although such 
concessions are used as a bargaining tool rather than a conflict resolution mechanism. 
Concessions to the unitary groups tend to address the dispute’s master cleavage much 
better, yet are used as accommodating strategy with the divided groups and aimed at 
revealing information about preferences as an alternative to fighting. Such a tactic is used as 
a substitute of the ‘divide-and-rule’ logic aimed at stirring further divisions of the non-state 
actors for an easier defeat of an internally weaker enemy. Concessions, then, represent not 
simply an outcome of negotiations, but also a part of the strategic bargaining process (K. G. 
Cunningham, 2011). Another way to look at concessions as a strategy in highly fragmented 
civil wars is through the logic of ‘wining away pieces”: the government has an incentive to 
reach partial agreement with individual factions in order to be able to concentrate its military 
capabilities on the remaining ones (Johnston, 2007). Although some argue that the 
government would be reluctant to grant concessions to the weaker groups to avoid 
legitimizing them (Bapat, 2005; Walter, 2002; I. W. Zartman, 1995), some evidence points to 
the contrary.   
In a multiparty context, the government is likely to co-opt some of the rebel factions in 
order to decrease the number of enemies and win against a stronger opponent (Findley & 
Rudloff, 2012; Nilsson, 2010), who had been able to effectively mobilize supporters and 
pose a real threat to the government (D. E. Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan, 2009). The 
counterintuitive logic is that the multitude of actors increases the chances of the weaker 
factions to receive concessions from the government (Nilsson, 2010) as a way of reducing 
the number of battlefields. Additionally, the smaller factions might either align with other 
groups, or join in on the negotiated settlement, thus increasing their chances for concessions 
in comparison with stronger rebel groups. The warring parties find a way of dealing with this 
complexity that the rebel fragmentation creates by either building coalitions or reducing the 
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number of players (Nilsson, 2010). However, the potential of agreements with the weaker 
factions to effectively terminate the conflict remains unclear. One of the reasons for the lack 
of such clarity is the zero-sum nature of political relevance2, which is often the core of the 
conflict’s master cleavage. Such zero-sum nature significantly diminishes the individual share 
of benefits from concessions for each actor due to the growing number of negotiation 
participants, thus increasing the risk of spoilers returning to violent means for achieving 
their greater goals. 
Although briefly discussed in some of the literature presented in this review, the direct 
effects of fragmentation on the negotiation outcomes, especially on the use and variation in 
the types of concessions yielded by the government, have been somewhat overlooked in the 
existing literature on the subject. When discussed, inter-rebel fragmentation is commonly 
understood to be an obstacle to success in peace negotiations (A. Kydd, 2003; Lilja, 2010; 
Regan & Aydin, 2006) or a way to terminate the violence, yet not effectively resolve the 
dispute (K. G. Cunningham, 2011; Fjelde & Nilsson, 2012). 
The argument in this study, therefore, is based on the analysis of the types of concessions 
fragmented movements receive from the incumbent government in comparison with those 
that more unified movements are able to achieve in civil wars. 
                                            
2“Politically relevant factions are those that other actors in the dispute must engage with, either militarily or 
politically. Political relevance refers to the position of the faction vis-a`-vis the state, rival factions, and the 
population it claims to represent.” (K. G. Cunningham, Bakke, & Seymour, 2012) 
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III. Theoretical Framework 
Definitions and Operationalization of Variables  
The terms ‘insurgents’, ‘rebels’ and ‘opposition’ are used in this research interchangeably. 
Although there are some distinctions between the terms, they do not represent a 
substantive enough difference for the purposes of this research. There is a major 
characteristic that ties these terms together, however: all the actors mentioned above 
contest government’s legitimate monopoly on the use of violence in the situations of 
internal violent conflict through the use of violent means to challenge the government’s 
authority (I. W. Zartman, 1995). Additionally, the terms ‘group’ and ‘faction’ are used in 
this study to identify the same concept – a group within a bigger movement that 
challenges government’s authority. 
Independent Variable 
The degree of fragmentation of non-state actors 
Fragmentation refers to the existence of a multitude of relatively powerful and competing 
factions fighting with the incumbent government for independence on behalf of the 
bigger group they claim to represent. Such factions can be represented by paramilitary 
organizations, armed groups, political parties, or civic organizations (K. G. Cunningham 
et al., 2012). The relevance of the factions is defined by their relative power to challenge 
both the state and other factions (Bakke et al., 2012).  The higher the number of factions 
of comparable power the rebel movement contains, the higher the degree of 
fragmentation in the movement is (Lawrence, 2010). The movement is considered 
cohesive if there is only one relatively powerful faction that contests the incumbent 
government. The movements examined in this research are of ethnic nature, seeking self-
determination as their overarching goal. 
Dependent Variable  
The scope of agreement – refers to the extent that the concessions in the agreement 
satisfy the initial demands of the rebel movement(s). The author makes no requirement 
that the agreement should effectively terminate the conflict.  
Important Def ini t ions and Concepts  
Rivalrousness – a characteristic of a good in economics, which reflects whether the 
consumption of a certain good by one person/group precludes its consumption by 
another person/group. 
Excludability – a characteristic of a good in economics, which reflects whether one 
person/group must pay (monetarily or otherwise) for a good in order to use it.  
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Classification of goods according to exclusivity and competitiveness 
Hypotheses and Causal Mechanisms 
The Logic  o f  Payof f s  
The degree of fragmentation has inevitable consequences for a movement that claims to 
be in pursuit of a collective interest of self-determination, as each group within the 
movement participates in “dual contests”: the contests with the state in pursuit of the 
common good for the group on behalf of which the faction operates and the contests 
with the co-ethnic factions within the movement in pursuit of private advantages (Bakke 
et al., 2012). The struggle over political relevance and material resources (the private 
advantages) within the rebel movement is concerned with private goods, such as material 
and power gains for the rebel leaders and their constituency (K. G. Cunningham et al., 
2012; Fjelde & Nilsson, 2012). These benefits are rivalrous by nature, as their 
consumption by one group precludes their consumption by any other faction. The club 
good related to the self-determination goals of the movement, however, can be shared, as 
it benefits the larger group as a whole. Nonetheless, the existence of multiple factions 
within the movement itself suggests fundamental disagreements over these shared 
interests of this bigger group. If the main unifying factor linking the groups together is 
their mobilization “around a collective identity in the pursuit of interests particular to this 
identity and the shared interests and common fate it engenders” (Bakke et al., 2012), then 
the logic suggests that, when given an opportunity to negotiate, each group would 
prioritize the conflicting individual interests over the shared movement interest. 
Individual factions, therefore, would be more willing to accept concessions of a smaller 
scale that do not necessarily address the conflict’s master cleavage, but rather serve as a 
‘payoff’ from the incumbent government to stop the immediate violence and neutralize 
the faction as a politically relevant contestant for power. In addition, the more factions 
there are, the smaller the potential concessions are, as there is only so much the 
government can offer. This limited pool of concessions (K. G. Cunningham et al., 2012) 
would, therefore, force the fragmented factions to readily accept the smaller concessions, 
rather than to continue fighting for the larger ones without any guarantee of success. 
 EXCLUDABLE NON-EXCLUDABLE 
RIVALROUS 
Private Goods 
(e.g. future power distribution 
within the existing framework, or a 
newly created one, access to 
resources) 
Common Goods 
(e.g. previously unavailable access 
to common-pool resources) 
NON-RIVALROUS 
Club Goods 
(e.g. federal autonomy with limited 
self-government) 
Public Goods 
(e.g. complete autonomy, 
independence) 
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From the incumbent government’s perspective, the logic of payoffs is quite intuitive. If 
we think of the government as a rational actor, its strategy towards the rebel movement 
follows two incentives: 1) minimization of the costs3 associated with the ongoing conflict, 
and 2) minimization of the salient concessions in order to retain as much power4 as 
possible (K. G. Cunningham, 2011). Realizing the existence of commitment problems 
that arise with the multitude of actors in civil wars, the government is less likely to give in 
to the larger demands that challenge its power due to the uncertainty associated with 
upholding ‘their part of the deal’. Therefore, should the costs of continued fighting 
outweigh the costs of concessions, the government, as a rational actor, is expected to 
make concessions to the factions of the fragmented movements. The concessions in such 
a scenario do not challenge the incumbent government’s power, but rather serve as 
payoffs to the factions. These concessions would not necessarily settle the dispute, but 
rather serve as a part of the bargaining process (Fjelde & Nilsson, 2012), a way of 
accommodating the factions in question. Concessions like these are, therefore, used to 
address the commitment problems; reveal information about the factions’ preferences, as 
the factions are more likely to have the insider information from their co-ethnics than the 
government is; flush out the strategic separatists5 and strengthen the moderates in the 
movement. Indeed, research suggests that the more fragmented movements tend to 
receive concessions at a much higher rate than the more unified ones, and the more 
fragmented the movement is, the more likely the government is to concede to the weaker 
groups within it. Yet, these concessions are less likely to settle the disputes (K. G. 
Cunningham, 2011). I therefore hypothesize that: 
H1: The more fragmented the rebel movement is, the more the concessions made by the incumbent 
government will be rivalrous and excludable in nature, therefore reflecting the characteristics of a private 
good. 
The Logic  o f  Conceding 
Unified movements are generally accepted to represent stronger challengers to the 
incumbent government (K. G. Cunningham, 2011) as they tend to have stronger military 
capacities, public support and they don’t suffer from commitment problems, which could 
hinder the negotiation efforts and limit the movement’s bargaining power. As such, they 
are in a position to demand more from the government, and the concessions should be 
able to satisfy all the groups in the movement, including the potential spoilers (Nilsson & 
                                            
3 Such costs can be diverse, from the number of deaths to diminished political support. 
4 Fragmentation of the rebel movement may create even larger concerns with the loss of power, as 
accommodation strategies might set precedents for other potential challengers of the state (Toft, 2003; 
Walter, 2006). 
5 Strategic separatists here refers to the factions that demand independence as their official bargaining 
offer, yet would be otherwise satisfied with much smaller concessions (K. G. Cunningham, 2011).  
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Söderberg Kovacs, 2011). Therefore, concessions are predicted to be relatively large6 and 
reflect the greater strength of the movement in comparison with the individual factions 
should they negotiate on their own. However large, the movement rarely receives exactly 
what it initially demands (the public good of independence) during the negotiations, as 
the government has an incentive to return to violence as an alternative to completely 
giving in to the movement’s demands. The movement does, however, relatively often 
receive partial independence in a form of federal autonomy with more self-government 
for the regions in question, resembling the characteristics of a club good, which, although 
excludable to the members of a specific ethnic group the movement represents, is non-
rivalrous. Such concessions to the more unified movements are much less frequent, but 
tend to address the conflict’s master cleavage, and therefore, are more likely to resolve 
the dispute (K. G. Cunningham, 2011) as they satisfy more of the original demands of 
the movement. I therefore hypothesize that: 
H2: The more cohesive the rebel movement is, the more the concessions made by the incumbent 
government will be excludable, yet non-rivalrous in nature, therefore reflecting the characteristics of a club 
good. 
Both hypotheses in this research are built on several assumptions. The first assumption is 
that fragmentation is a dynamic concept, varying in its degrees and types as new groups 
are created and eliminated, alliances formed and dissolved, and power is dispersed across 
groups or concentrated within one faction over the course of the civil war (Bakke et al., 
2012). Secondly, rebel leaders and incumbent governments are rational strategic actors, 
e.g. motivated not exclusively by common good or ideology, but also base their decisions 
on the cost-and-benefit analysis with an intention of profit-maximization and survival. 
The negotiation attempts in any conflict are not necessarily directed at addressing the 
conflict’s master cleavage, but are often aimed at putting an immediate stop to violence in 
order to decrease the costs of protracted fighting. The final assumption in this research is 
that the demands of various factions within the movement may differ and sometimes 
conflict with the demands of other competing factions to some degree. However, all 
groups that claim to be representing the interests of the bigger group should represent an 
“overlapping, collective identity and pursue interests particular to it” (Bakke et al., 2012). 
 
                                            
6 Large concessions represent a bigger piece of the initial demands 
  
 
16 
Research Design 
IV. Research Design 
Methodology 
Although useful to identify the links between dependent and independent variables, 
quantitative large-N statistical analysis does not represent a necessary tool to establish the 
cause and effect links (Mampilly, 2011). This study establishes the causal link between 
fragmentation and the types of concessions the non-state actors receive in the multiparty 
civil wars. Through two case studies, the author is able to identify plausible causal 
variables, which is essential to testing the theory on concessions as payoffs or a way to 
resolve the dispute as it applies to fragmented non-state actors and the government. Case 
study methodology is, therefore, the most useful for this research as it is simultaneously 
sensitive to data and theory (George & Bennett, 2005).  
The method of analysis chosen for this study is process-tracing. Process-tracing, unlike 
statistical analysis and controlled comparison, forces the researcher to take equifinality 
into account, thus allowing for the consideration of alternative causal mechanism that 
could lead to the same outcome (George & Bennett, 2005). Unlike the controlled 
comparison, which requires the cases under investigation to be similar in every respect 
but one, process-tracing allows for the variables to be examined for causal significance 
within a single case, allowing the researcher to achieve a high level of conceptual validity 
(George & Bennett, 2005). This study investigates the causal mechanisms within two 
cases, thus process-tracing represents the best fitting methodology choice. 
Although the chosen method has numerous advantages, there exist certain limitations 
with regards to the case study. Firstly, there is a potential for the case selection bias, 
present, along with the other systematic errors, in most studies of qualitative nature 
(George & Bennett, 2005). Secondly, the results of this research might be case-specific, 
thus not generalizable, and would need to be further tested on a larger number of cases. 
However, the aim of this research is theory-building, leaving the question of 
generalizability for further theory-testing studies. 
Case Selection 
The two cases analyzed in this study are Southern Sudanese second civil war and the 
second rebellion in Darfur. In choosing the case study, two criteria guide case selection. 
Firstly, the author selected the case of Sudan for a variation on the independent variable 
– the degree of fragmentation of the rebel movement within one case. Due to the time 
and resource limitations the second criteria is the availability of sources on the numerous 
negotiation attempts with some sort of an agreement that could provide information for 
testing the previously specified hypotheses. 
On the one hand, Sudan is a unique case. Before the secession of South Sudan in 2011, 
the country represented Africa’s largest state with the territory of 2.5 million square 
kilometers and the geography so diverse that it creates a serious challenge for establishing 
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 authority over rebellious regions (Herbst, 2000). Ethnic diversity of the Sudanese people 
is extraordinary: 597 different ethnic groups speak 400 languages and dialects within the 
same country. On the other hand, however, Sudan scores high on the risk factors 
strongly associated with civil wars, such as weak statehood, rough terrain, political 
instability, a large population with a small military establishment, inconsistent democratic 
institutions and a war-prone, undemocratic neighbors, making it a typical war-prone state 
(Hegre & Sambanis, 2006). 
The inclusion of both, Southern Sudan and Darfur allows for the variation in the degree 
of fragmentation of the rebel movements (the South Sudanese self-determination 
movement was much more cohesive in comparison with the more divided in aims and 
resources Darfur’s rebels), while controlling for the state policy and similar 
counterinsurgency strategies (Seymour, Forthcoming). Controlling for these factors 
allows for a more clear identification of the causal relationship between the independent 
and dependent variables. 
Data 
The research is based on qualitative data. Various sources that provided a more detailed 
explanation of the conflicts’ backgrounds, major players and the chronology of events. 
Among those were the Uppsala Conflict Database conflict profiles7, International Crisis 
Group reports8, Accord: an International Review of Peace Initiatives (online journal), 
scholarly journal articles, books, think-tank and NGOs’ reports, newspaper articles, 
websites of relevant political organizations representing factions. Additional sources that 
allowed for the analysis of the concessions themselves were the peace agreements under 
investigation in this study.  
Limitations of the Research Design 
One of the main limitations of this research is that it is restricted to two case studies 
within one country, thus limiting the generalizability of results. However, the purpose of 
this study is theory-building, allowing for the developed theory to be tested later on a 
larger number of cases.  Additionally, due to the language limitation, the author was only 
be able to access sources in English, which might have provided a biased and/or 
incomplete image of the case. Furthermore, the author had the final authority on the 
categorization of the concessions, thus allowing for other scholars to reach different 
results should the study be replicated. These limitations would have to be addressed in 
the future study of the effects of fragmentation on the types of concessions rebel groups 
receive in civil wars. 
                                            
7 http://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php 
8 http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/ 
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 V. Southern Sudan: The Plague of Initials? 
In the 22 years of Africa’s longest civil war, Sudanese government (GoS) and Sudan’s 
numerous militia groups have gone through countless negotiation attempts in their 
search for peace. Some factors precluding the signing of a peace agreement include the 
remnants of the colonial pattern of administrative tribalism, effectively borrowed by the 
successive Sudanese governments, marginalization and exploitation of the oil-rich 
Southern periphery (LeRiche & Arnold, 2012), continuous use of the ‘divide-and-rule’ 
tactics (Harir & Salih, 1994), and GoS’ use of proxies to fight its battles (Arnold, 2007). 
Some list the proliferation of named rebel groups that allegedly reflected the divided 
Southern9 political opinions (Johnson, 2003) among such factors as well. The complete 
breakdown of local conflict resolution mechanisms throughout the decades of war has 
led to the militarization of the small diverse communities in the South, causing the 
striving violent competition over economic and political power (Deng, 2010). The 
abundance of local actors inevitably caused the GoS and the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement (SPLM)10 – the most politically relevant and significant rebel group in the 
south – to compete over the support of the local actors. Their tactics included offers of 
military backing and alliance, often through deliberately undermining the rural 
subsistence economy by using the asset-stripping tactics11 . Such deliberate actions, 
therefore, forced the local communities to rely on either side for survival (Johnson, 2003; 
LeRiche & Arnold, 2012). The existence of numerous local militias reflects the 
fragmented nature of the war, yet the case of Southern Sudan reflects the dynamic 
characteristics of rebel fragmentation. The analysis below demonstrates the change from 
high level of rebel movement fragmentation in the beginning of the war (associated with 
little progress towards a peace agreement, yet numerous smaller agreements with 
individual militia groups) towards more cohesion by 1997. Such a sequence of events 
created an appropriate environment for fruitful negotiations and the eventual signing of 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which provided for a referendum on 
secession (H2), serving as a cornerstone of the agreement. Due to time and resource 
limitations, I will only look at major peace agreements, essentially excluding procedural 
                                            
9 Southern Sudan will refer to the territory in Sudan that was contested and fought over, while South 
Sudan will refer to the newly established country by means of a referendum in 2011. 
10 The SPLM is a political affiliate of movement, with the SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army) 
constituting its military wing. Colonel John Garang de Mabior served as a chairman of both, thus 
undermining the distinction. Due to the insignificance of the distinction for the purposes of this research, 
both terms are used interchangeably. 
11 The intention of the asset-stripping raids has from the very beginning of the war been not only to seize 
the assets in possession of the local population, but also to limit the potential resources for the opposing 
side, including the treatment of civilians as resources themselves, especially in the later stages of the war, 
when the SPLA gain control of more territory. However, assets stripped from the local population were 
often used as currency by Khartoum’s southern guerilla allies (Johnson, 2003).  
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 agreements, ceasefires, people-to-people reconciliations processes and factional talks 
from the analysis. 
Rebel Fragmentation in Southern Sudan 
Three simultaneous actions signified the abrogation of the 1972 Addis Ababa peace 
agreement, guaranteeing Southern autonomy, and the start of the second civil war in 
Southern Sudan. These were the ‘redivision’ of the Southern periphery into constituent 
parts, provinces and sub-regions; establishment of the September Laws, renewing and 
strengthening the imposition of sharia law in the whole of Sudan; and, especially 
significant for the southerners, their marginalization in the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). 
Attempts by Khartoum to resettle Southern soldiers to the north also magnified the 
problem. The first ones to take up arms in resistance to the central policies of the 
Khartoum government in the late 1970s were the dissatisfied veterans of the first civil 
war – the Anyanya II movement – joint by the SPLA under the leadership if John Garang 
in 1983. However, competition within the two groups grounded in paranoia and 
individual ambition of the leaders (LeRiche & Arnold, 2012) led to the victory of the 
SPLA. Most of Anyanya II forces were absorbed by the SPLM, with the central 
government splintering the rest into Khartoum-supported militias (Arnold, 2007).  
However, the Southern resistance movement did not stay cohesive for much longer. In 
1991, two of the SPLA’s senior commanders, Lam Akola and Riek Machar, defected 
from the movement over the ruthless and autocratic leadership of Garang and the issues 
concerning Southern independence (Johnson, 2003; O’Ballance, 2000). In fact, Garang’s 
problem-solving mechanisms involved active abuse of human rights, recruitment of child 
soldiers and numerous raids with confiscation and destruction of local communities’ 
resources (Johnson, 2003; LeRiche & Arnold, 2012). Such actions contributed to the 
rapid proliferation of armed militias in the south, formed with a simple purpose of 
protecting themselves against the SPLA. These militias were formed among Mundari, 
Toposa, Bari, and other peoples in eastern Equatoria, the Fertit and even some Dinkas in 
Bahr el-Ghazal and Murle in southeastern Upper Nile. The members of these 
communities shared the anti-Muslim and anti-Arab sentiment with most other 
southerners. However, their main ideological difference with the SPLM was the rejection 
of the “New Sudan” concept, according to which Southern Sudan, although with much 
more autonomy and political representation, would remain a part of Sudan. This notion 
went against their undisputable support of the idea of Southern self-determination. Such 
militias were strategically used by the GoS as southerner ‘proxies’, a fundamental 
principle of Sudanese politics where northerners supply allies from the south to fight 
their “own-brother enemies” (Rogier, 2005: 12). For example, the GoS supplied Murle 
militias with weaponry to attack the communities (predominantly Nuer and Dinka) from 
which the SPLA drew support and recruited most of its forces (Johnson, 2003). 
However, with the limited scope, resources and forced affiliation with the GoS, the 
militias remained on the level of local organizations with the main objective of defending 
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 their own communities (Young, 2003). By pursuing their own grievances with the SPLA 
forces and staying local they rendered themselves unable to challenge the GoS and, 
consequently, politically irrelevant.  
Not long after their defection from the SPLA, Akola and Machar’s ideological differences 
with Garang over the self-determination concept led to a brutal and widespread war 
between Nuers (from which the leaders drew their support) and Dinkas (predominantly 
associated with Garang’s movement). The SPLA-mainstream (the Torit faction lead by 
Garang), being better supplied and more numerous, won the war, thus forcing Akola and 
Machar (the Nasir commanders) to seek the GoS support. However, soon after the 
agreement with the GoS was signed in 1992, Lam and Riek separated once again, this 
time each heading yet another faction of the Southern movement: SPLA-United stayed 
under the leadership of Akol, while Machar created the South Sudan Independence 
Movement (SSIM).  Further fragmentation of the rebel movement happened with the 
Equatorians forming the Equatoria Defence Forces (EDF). All three groups 
(characteristically not clearly demarcated in terms of their ideologies, political grievances 
and territorial constituencies) were unable to sustain themselves in the fight against the 
SPLA. Looking for support, they signed a Political Charter with the GoS in 1996, 
consequently moving their headquarters to Khartoum. Their alliance with the 
government made them once again much less politically relevant as a potential challenger 
to the state. The factions were finally discredited upon the signing of the Khartoum 
Peace Agreement in 1997. The loyalties of individuals in the armed groups were typically 
transient and temporary. This becomes obvious from the fragmentation dynamics of the 
movement, based largely on individual ambition and exploitation of local diversity, rather 
than irreconcilable ideological differences. The pursuit of personal interest often trumped 
ideology (Young, 2006). Such a pattern suggests individual motives behind the 
negotiations with the GoS (H1). This characteristic provided plenty of opportunities for 
Khartoum to use the lack of loyalties to their advantage through manipulating actors in 
Sudan’s Southern periphery, forcing them to fight the ‘civil wars inside a civil war’ 
(Arnold, 2007). 
Interestingly, however, such trend eventually led to the revival of the SPLA-Torit as the 
main and only rebel group strong enough to challenge Khartoum, with a central role in 
the new national opposition (Johnson, 2003). The central paradox of the SPLM-United, 
like many other smaller factions, was their military alliance with the GoS, while the goal 
of the movement – Southern independence – was seemingly irreconcilable with those of 
Khartoum. The GoS categorically insisted on the idea of the Islamic state with the 
implementation of sharia law in the whole of Sudan in the late 1980s. Later in 1990 it 
hinted at a potential for a compromise in a form of independence for the Southern 
periphery, when no military headway benefitting the GoS was possible. The proposed 
independence, however, included a considerably smaller Southern territory than expected 
and demanded by the rebels, excluding all the oil fields, and thus rendering the 
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 proposition unacceptable by any of the Southern factions (Johnson, 2003). As the break-
away groups, including the SPLA-United, became tied to the government for their 
survival, each move they attempted on their own was restricted by their military alliance. 
This effectively limited any real moves towards the exercise of Southern self-
determination, making them the GoS puppets and ultimately destroying their credibility 
and movements themselves. The 1992 Frankfurt agreement between the Nasir faction 
and the GoS, with no mention of Southern independence demonstrated this trend. Abuja 
talks in 1992-1993 in which the government gained an upper hand in relation to the 
continuation of sharia law imposition, Islam as the state religion and Arabic as the state 
language provide further evidence in support of such a claim (Raftopoulos & Karin, 
2006).  
Some argue that the GoS alliance with numerous militias in the south was not the only 
factor increasing the overall Southern movement cohesion and particularly SPLA’s gains. 
An important aspect of such development was the constantly increasing military and 
political cohesion of the northern and Southern opposition groups under the umbrella of 
the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) (Johnson, 2003). Major northern political 
parties like Umma, Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and National Islaimic Front (NIF) 
were strongly opposed to Garang’s idea of the “New Sudan” where the northern 
dominance would end through the restructuring of power relations in Khartoum. 
Nevertheless, several factors made the cohesion possible. International recognition of the 
southerners’ right for self-determination as an integral part of democracy, and human 
rights to which NDA was committed influenced the movement. Additionally, Sudan’s 
neighbors’ insistence on a united movement and the SPLA’s limited influence outside the 
south promoted such an idea. (Johnson, 2003; Young, 2003). Thus, by March 1996, the 
SPLA represented a relatively united, cohesive movement and a true representative of the 
Southern constituencies with the main objective of Southern self-determination. 
However, for the sake of appearances and inclusion, in 1997 the GoS signed an 
agreement with 6 rebel factions as a political facade12 and a way to neutralize the potential 
threat of those groups gaining more local support. The SSIM, EDF, SPLA-United and 
three smaller break-away groups (SPLA Bahr el-Ghazal Group, Bor Group, and South 
Sudan Independence Group), all of which were officially or unofficially dependent on 
Khartoum for their survival, signed the deal that promised a referendum on Southern 
self-determination after an interim period. Although the emptiness of that promise is as 
widely accepted today as it was in 1997 by the signatories, the agreement represents an 
interesting case for the analysis of the effects of fragmentation on the concessions in the 
second Sudanese civil war. The following section analyses the negotiation attempts 
between the government and the numerous rebel groups in the south leading up to and 
                                            
12 At this point, the headquarters of these rebel groups were situated in Khartoum, further proving the 
interdependence of the groups with the GoS and the political irrelevance of the agreements. 
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 resulting in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 by the 
GoS and the SPLM, effectively putting an end to Africa’s longest civil war.  
Abuja Talks (1992-1993) 
In 1992-1993 the GoS and the SPLM, including SPLM-United, gathered in Abuja, 
Nigeria in an attempt to reach a peace agreement. Although such was the official 
objective, Abuja talks turned out to produce much different outcomes than expected. 
Due to the split in the opposition movement, the GoS was able to keep its commitment 
to sharia law throughout Sudan and the Islamic state with Arabic as an official national 
language. These issues, on top of the ever so present quest for self-determination, served 
as stumbling blocks for the peace process at Abuja as much as anywhere else. Although 
the agreement did not address the conflict’s master cleavage, the parties did manage to 
agree on a temporary arrangement with the specific provisions for equitable wealth 
sharing and decentralization of power (Raftopoulos & Karin, 2006). These concessions 
are somewhat reflective of a club good. Yet, upon a closer examination of the allocation 
of important local positions as a result of the arrangement, certain private motives behind 
the agreement become obvious. In addition, the lack of effective implementation 
indicates the lack of commitment from the government to uphold the deal, which in turn 
negates the seemingly salient concessions all together. This, in turn, negates the 
significance of talks in their relation to conflict resolution, and implies the smokescreen 
nature of the negotiations, thus discrediting their relevance to this research. 
However, the split in the movement was evident as never before. Garang’s strategy in 
overcoming that obstacle was his appointment of a Nuer, not Dinka13, commander 
Nyuon as a leader of the SPLM-mainstream delegation to the first Abuja talks in 1992. 
During the negotiation the commander and then Chief of Staff Nyuon received an offer 
of financial inducements from the GoS to leave the SPLA, which he accepted and 
resigned from his post right after the negotiations (Johnson, 2003). This allowed for the 
SPLA-United, with the support of the GoS, to further ignite the war between Dinka and 
Nuer, in an attempt to weaken the SPLA-mainstream. Although formally not part of the 
agreement, the financial inducements represent the characteristics of a private good that 
the negotiator was able to receive in a form of concession due to the internal split of the 
movement between the SPLA-mainstream and the SPLA-United, thus providing ground 
for establishing a pattern further demonstrated during the Khartoum agreement 
negotiations in 1997 (H1). 
Although the talks in Abuja did not succeed in establishing a peace agreement, they did 
achieve one thing: through discrediting the SPLA-United as a legitimate representative of 
                                            
13 Representatives of the Dinka tribe constituted the majority of the SPLM forces 
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 its constituents due to its alliance with the GoS, the talks managed to create a more 
cohesive movement with a common unifying goal (Raftopoulos & Karin, 2006). 
Khartoum Peace Agreement (1997) 
By signing the Fashoda 14  and Khartoum Peace Agreements in 1997 the GoS 
simultaneously achieved three goals. First of all, it neutralized 6 already largely associated 
with them factions of the Southern movement. Secondly, it created a military force 
consistent of the Southern factions large and strong enough to defend the GoS from the 
SPLM forces in the south, thus weakening the SPLM. Finally, the GoS created a new 
opportunity to exploit the oil fields in the northern part of the Southern Sudan. The 
agreement incorporated the general principles of Peace Charter signed a year prior to the 
Khartoum Agreement and specified the federal structure of Sudan with the creation of a 
new Coordinating Council for the Southern States (Johnson, 2003). Areas under federal 
control, according to the agreement, included national security and control of the armed 
forces. Limited control over economic development was allowed for the Southern Sudan, 
as long as it was in accordance with the federal planning. The concessions in regards to 
the political structure can, on the one hand, be characterized as a private good, as the 
new Coordinating Council positions would provide financial benefits to their holders that 
are both excludable and rivalrous. On the other hand, the Council itself is a club good, 
excludable to the Southern Sudanese constituents, yet non-rivalrous in nature. Given the 
patterns of political behavior and abuse of power in Sudan, combined with the severe 
limitation the Council’s powers, the club good characteristics of its creation are relatively 
insignificant. Limited control over the economic development of Southern Sudan as 
another concession represents characteristics of a club good, as its benefits could only be 
enjoyed by the citizens of the Southern territories in question, yet the enjoyment of the 
gains from the control over economic development by one citizen of the Southern Sudan 
does not preclude their enjoyment by the other. However, given the limited scope and 
insignificance of the concession in comparison with the rest of the agreement, control 
over economic development was largely symbolic, and is, therefore, also insignificant.  
Seemingly important, yet disqualified as such due to the lack of the intention on behalf of 
the government to implement the agreement and the irrelevance of the rebel groups as 
state challengers, is the promise of a referendum at the end of the interim period. While 
generally characterized as a club good, this promise did not constitute a real concession, 
as the GoS was never intent on holding a referendum in the south and used the 
concession as a façade while achieving its other goals. 
The signatories of the agreements included the SSIM, the SPLA-Bahr el-Ghazal Group, 
the SPLM-United, the EDF, the SPLA Independent Group from Nuba Mountains, and 
                                            
14 Fashoda Agreement was an addendum to the Khartoum Peace Agreement 
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 the Bor Group, each included for the sake of giving the appearance of “embracing the 
plurality of Southern political opinion”, and operating under the umbrella of the new 
United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF) (Johnson, 2003; Young, 2006). None of the 
groups, except for SSIM, had permanent troops in the South, excluding the government 
garrisons. Each, however, had political personnel in Khartoum prior to the agreement. 
The armies of all the factions, under the Khartoum Peace Agreement, were to be 
amalgated into the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF), lead by Riek Machar. 
Through the creation of the SSDF – government-allied forces in the south – the GoS 
neutralized their potential military threat and created a military under its control to 
protect its assets, especially those in the oil field in the south that the government 
received control15 over under the agreement (Arnold, 2007; Young, 2006). The formation 
of the SSDF served another important function: under the 1997 agreement, the 
government promised a referendum on unity or succession for the Southern Sudan after 
a vaguely formulated interim period, however without any intention of keeping the 
promise. Through the strategic use of Military Intelligence (MI), the agency that, for the 
most part, assumed responsibility for the SSDF control, the GoS worked to undermine 
the organizational development and, thus, power of the SSDF. The job was achievable 
precisely due to the local divisions and the individual ambition of local commanders, 
willing to carve out their semi-independent domains (Young, 2006). Without strong 
organizational structure, the SSDF (and UDSF, whose development was equally 
compromised by the GoS) was unable to implement many of the Khartoum Agreement’s 
provisions. This limitation included the referendum, which served as the cornerstone of 
the agreement and the answer to the master cleavage of the Southern Sudanese civil war 
(Young, 2006).  
Interestingly, apart from the formal concessions the government yielded in 
negotiations 16 , a number of individual arrangements in relation to power sharing 
negotiated as a part of the Khartoum Peace agreement are relevant to the analysis of the 
agreement. Riek Machar, one of the key persons during the negotiations, formerly a 
commander of the SPLM and the leader of the SSIM at the moment of negotiations, 
established a regional government in Juba, of which he became the president. Under the 
agreement, he also became the commander-in-chief of the SSDF, an assistant to the 
president of the Republic of Sudan, and the head of the UDSF political party (Young, 
2006). The positions, occupied by Riek Machar, offered him considerable power and 
                                            
15 The GoS could exercise its control through the SSDF 
16 Most of the concessions yielded by the government were small in scale and insignificant, failing to 
address the conflict’s master cleavage. Although the promise of a referendum was officially incorporated 
into the agreement, evidence suggests that all the negotiating parties were aware that the prospects of 
implementation of that promise were extremely low, especially because the major military and political 
challenger of the GoS – the SPLM – was not included in the negotiations. 
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 access to material resources, reflecting the characteristics of private goods and serving as 
a sort of payoff for the conclusion of the agreement (H1). 
Paulino Matieb, another chief negotiator on behalf of the South Sudan Unity Movement 
(SSUM), was appointed to the post of the governor of the oil-rich Unity State in 
Machar’s government, against Machar’s recommendation, yet with the GoS backing. 
Matieb also served as a chief of staff of the newly formed SSDF and the major-general of 
the SAF, being one of only four SSDF members to hold such senior rank in the national 
army. Such promotions, as a result of the Khartoum agreement, are also characteristics of 
private goods, as their benefit to Matieb are undeniable, and no one else would be able to 
enjoy the gains from the positions as long as Matieb occupied them (H1). Lam Akol, 
another signatory to the Khartoum Peace Agreement, served as the transport minister in 
Machar’s government after it was formed, thus receiving private benefits from the 
agreement. 
The Khartoum Peace Agreement, therefore, represented a major farce, a hollow 
document that neither involved the true challengers of the governments (which at that 
point was the SPLM faction), nor truly addressed the issues most salient to the Southern 
opposition (Ofuho, 2006). If, however, the signatories are to be considered politically 
relevant, then their fragmentation and internal divisions within the movement are to be 
blamed for weakening their bargaining position and, consequently, allowing them to only 
negotiate private payoffs, rather than achieve true Southern autonomy from the central 
government. The GoS achieved its two major goals during the negotiations: it weakened 
the threat of the SPLM and received an opportunity for the exploitation of the oil fields, 
both accomplished through the creation of the SSDF. 
The Importance of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
In 2005, the CPA, negotiated between the GoS and the SPLM with the involvement of 
international mediators under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD), served as a 241-page document that ended Africa’s longest civil 
war. In retrospect, CPA secured independence, oil revenues for the South, and a large 
enough army to serve as a deterrent to the potential northern aggression (Natsios, 2012). 
The negotiation process, however long and painstakingly slow, involved separate 
negotiations of each agreement to be later included in CPA. The intention of the 
agreement was not simply to silence the guns, although much to that effect, but rather to 
transform Sudan into a just country where all the marginalized people have an equal say 
in how the country is run and the way its resources are allocated. As such, the CPA 
represented the “cornerstone of the first mutually-agreed secession in Africa” 
(Rolandsen, 2011). Whatever the forces that brought the agreement into existence, each 
party had a different agenda for agreeing to come to the negotiation table.  For the GoS, 
the CPA (and the interim constitution it brought about) was caused by the need to bring 
a politically and militarily powerful rival into a coalition in order to deal with other rebels, 
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 especially the ones in Darfur that were putting more and more pressure and costs on the 
GoS, through further agreements later (el-Battahani, 2006). It also served as a way to 
bring stability to Sudan and consolidate all the resources on the ambitious development 
projects of the GoS (Curless & Rodt, 2013), such as the dam building program 
(Verhoeven, 2013). For the rebels, the CPA was the opportunity to realize the ambition 
of its own state, be it independent or within a federal system with much autonomy for 
the south, with the possibilities of economic development, namely such resources as land 
and water (Curless & Rodt, 2013). 
Apart from the obvious significance of the agreement, it also represents an important 
case study for the ability of a cohesive movement to extract salient concessions of the 
club good nature from the incumbent government, as opposed to the fragmented 
opposition in pursuit of the same goals (H2). The following section describes the types 
of concessions the SPLM was able to receive in negotiating the CPA. 
The CPA 
Machakos protocol17, signed by the GoS and the SPLM in 2002, was the first, and many 
would argue, the most significant development in the process of ending the civil war. 
Whereas the previous peace initiatives were hindered by internal divisions and disputes 
among the rebel groups themselves, now the SPLM embodied a truly cohesive 
movement, representing the whole of Southern Sudan and contested areas of the Nuba 
Mountains, Abyei and Southern Blue Nile, providing the movement with a much 
stronger negotiating position (Rogier, 2005). Not only was the movement internally 
cohesive, but it also had the international support of Eritrea, Kenya, Ethiopia and 
Uganda, as the potential of an independent South Sudan as a buffer state was quite 
alluring for the neighboring countries (Høigilt, Rolandsen, & Falch, 2010). GoS’ 
preoccupation with power struggles and internal strife, economic crisis and international 
isolation (Carney, 2007; International Crisis Group, 2002) had significantly weakened its 
bargaining position prior to negotiations. The SPLM, however, more cohesive than ever 
with the backing of African neighbors, and the involvement of troika led by the US, 
international recognition and support of the principle of self-determination, increased its 
likelihood of extracting concessions from the GoS. Engagement in talks, therefore, 
became the matter of survival for the GoS leaders (Rolandsen, 2011). Such dynamics 
allowed for a breakthrough in the negotiations: the protocol finally addressed the 
conflict’s master cleavage in the form of two most salient issues – separation of state and 
religion and Southern self-determination. 
                                            
17 Machakos Protocol is a part of the CPA. 
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 Under the protocol, a six-year interim period was to be established18 , after which 
Southern Sudan would hold an internationally monitored referendum on unity or 
succession from Sudan. During the interim period, Southern Sudan was to be governed 
by the newly-formed Southern Sudanese government (GoSS), as well as equitably 
participate in the national government of Sudan. A new, decentralized system of 
government was to be established, with the Government of National Unity (GNU) at its 
center and the split 70:30 in representation, favoring NCP in the northern states, and the 
SPLM in the southern part of the country. The first of two Vice-Presidents was to be the 
chair of the SPLM. The imposition of sharia law, one of the issues that ignited the 
conflict in the 1970s, was to only be implemented in the northern Sudan, with parts of 
the constitution being re-written so as to allow for non-Muslims throughout the country 
to be exempt from sharia law. Although the agreement promised a referendum on 
possible succession, the implementation of peace, according to the protocol, was to be 
conducted so as to promote the unity of Sudan over southern independence. Even 
though granting the right to self-determination was politically costly the GoS, it was the 
only way to guarantee sharia law in the northern Sudan (Rolandsen, 2011). Under the 
security arrangements, the SPLA was allowed to keep its army separate from the SAF, 
partially to guarantee the implementation of the agreement, and partially to ensure the 
South’s ability to defend itself should the agreement not be implemented. However, both 
parties were to equally contribute to the ‘joint integrated units’ stationed in Southern 
Sudan, three contested areas and Khartoum. Should the referendum reveal the vote in 
favor of unity, the troops were to be completely integrated into the national army. 
Acceptable for the GoS, the agreement was a clear victory to the SPLM, as there was no 
military leverage over the south that Khartoum would be able to use in the future 
(Rolandsen, 2011). The main part of the wealth-sharing arrangement was that the GoSS 
received 50% of all oil revenues, and that the transfers were to be made directly without 
Khartoum’s intervention in order to avoid corruption and potential theft. 
The promise of a referendum on succession, reduced implementation of sharia law and 
creation of a separate GoSS army all reflect the characteristics of a club good, as they are 
excludable to the Southern Sudanese only, yet the benefits from these concessions can be 
enjoyed by all Southern Sudanese without precluding the consumption of one by 
another. Creation of the GoSS, however, partially reflects the common characteristics of 
a private good. It benefits certain high-ranking rebel leaders through providing them with 
an access to resources in the public office, yet it also created the political institution in the 
area where the Southern Sudanese citizens could address their grievances and demand 
their resolution, thus making it a club good. In addition, equitable participation in the 
national government, the chair of the SPLM becoming the Vice-President of Sudan and 
the receipt of the 50% of the oil revenues directly to Southern Sudan are clear examples 
                                            
18 The interim period was dated from 9 July 2005 
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 of private goods that were included in the CPA. The only truly public good, which, in 
theory, was supposed to be non-excludable to a certain ethnic group, but rather enjoyed 
by all the Sudanese citizens without precluding consumption by one another was the 
creation of a more decentralized and democratic GNU. 
The pattern described above strongly suggests the validity of the argument, that a more 
cohesive movement is able to extract concessions that reflect the characteristics of a club 
good, such as the exercise of the right for self-determination, exemption of the 
southerners from the sharia law and the ability to maintain its own army (H1). 
The Three Contested Regions 
In the month following the signing of Machakos agreement, the SPLM pushed for 
separate negotiations in the three areas: Abyei and two administered regions, Southern 
Kordofan and Blue Nile. Each of the areas status was negotiated separately in accordance 
with the GoS request, with each negotiating team coming directly from the area in 
question. Such conditions divided the groups into three from the GoS and three from the 
SPLM, thus downplaying the SPLM’s status as a truly national movement and preventing 
it from challenging the GoS from a stronger position (Matus, 2006). Under such 
circumstances, the SPLM had to yield salient concessions in regards to the Nuba 
Mountains and Southern Blue Nile and their participation in the Southern referendum. 
Under the agreements, Southern Kordofan absorbed the Nuba Mountains based on its 
boundaries prior to 1974, while Southern Blue Nile became the Blue Nile state. Abyei, 
however, was accorded a special administrative status during the interim period, with the 
participation in the Southern referendum on the matter of either maintaining the special 
status, or becoming a part of Bahr al-Ghazal (Warap) state. Appropriate wealth-sharing 
arrangements were also included for each of the three regions. Abyei, therefore, received 
two club goods (the special status and a promise of a referendum) along with the private 
good of wealth-sharing arrangements, while Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile were mostly 
given the private goods in the form of financial contributions.  
Conclusion 
The case of Southern Sudan provides ample evidence in support of the argument that as 
the movement fragmentation decreases, its chances of winning over concessions that 
address the conflict’s master cleavage and its underlying causes increase. Unable to 
achieve an implementable agreement with concessions representing club goods during 
the peaks of rebel fragmentation, the SPLM did manage to sign a deal with the 
government that guaranteed its right for self-determination once the smaller groups 
united into one.  The case, therefore, is in line with both H1 and H2 of this study. 
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VI. Darfur: Divided They Fall 
From the very beginning of the rebellion, Darfur’s opposition lacked a unified movement 
with a charismatic and capable leader, as well as both military and political structures, like 
the SPLM/A. However, such fragmentation was not the only factor that stood in the way 
of achieving a peace agreement between the Darfur insurgents and the GoS. The rebel’s 
understanding of the struggle for liberation was justified and fought for on the basis of a 
political agenda. The underlying causes for their constituencies are rooted in a much 
more tangible issue, namely the control of resources necessary for their future survival 
(Sørbø & Ahmed, 2013). Khartoum, realizing the difference in perception, had repeatedly 
played on it to weaken the rebel groups that refused to sign peace agreements. The 
government did so by offering rebel leaders numerous financial bargains, such as jobs, 
money and supplies to separate from the rebel militias with which they were associated. 
The described trend contributed to the development of the patronage networks 
throughout Sudan. As a result, the groups that formed from such divide-and-rule tactics 
were lacking any political agenda, yet equipped with captured weapons (Natsios, 2012). 
The existence of such ‘agendaless’ militias perfectly reflects the nature of Darfur within-
rebel fragmentation dynamics. In Darfur, no cohesive movement, regardless of the local 
and international attempts, was possible or existed at any point in time. The analysis 
below demonstrates that no vital changes occurred during the war as the fragmentation 
levels increased or decreased, and at no specific time was the Darfurian rebel movement 
cohesive enough to extract truly salient concessions of the club good nature (H1). Due to 
time and resource limitations, I will only look at major peace agreements, essentially 
excluding procedural agreements, ceasefires, people-to-people reconciliations processes 
and factional talks from the analysis. 
Rebel Fragmentation in Darfur 
The recent armed conflict in Darfur, commonly referred to as the ‘third rebellion’, began 
with the intensification of the attacks of the Fur villages by Janjawiid, government-
affiliated Arab militias, under the command of Sheikh Moussa Hillal. Moussa Hillal 
served as the commander of a hardline Arab faction in Darfur in exchange for a generous 
land contribution by President Bashir at the expense of one of the three tribes in the 
rebellion. He was responsible for the recruitment and mobilization of the Um Jalal clan 
to raid and attack the rebellious villages (Natsios, 2012). The anti-GoS violence was 
ignited by the increased Janjawiid violence19 and the lack of democratic institutions to 
                                            
19 For decades largely nomadic ethnically Arab groups had attacked the traditionally farming African 
communities in Darfur for grazing and water, often triggering violence from both sides. The attacks of 
2002 constituted a significant increase in the degree of violence, including severe rape of the women and 
murder of young men in the villages, often blamed on their affiliation with the GoS, who the government 
considers a threat to its power (Dagne & Everett, 2004). 
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redress the grievances. However, the reasons for two Darfurian movements – the Sudan 
Liberation Movement (SLM) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) – to launch 
attacks in 2003 against government installation, with which Janjawiid is largely affiliated, 
were numerous and complex.  
The underlying reason for the armed resistance was the struggle against the historic 
economic and political marginalization of Darfur (Dagne & Everett, 2004; Williams & 
Simpson, 2011) against the backdrop of growing tribal polarization due to the ongoing 
land dispute between the nomadic Arab camel herders and non-Arab farmers (mostly 
Fur, Zaghawa and Massaleit groups), whose land they wanted to use for grazing. 
Increased distribution of automatic weapons among the Arab militias (Flint & de Waal, 
2005; Natsios, 2012) served as yet another contributing factor. Progressive 
desertification, drought, and increased property privatization made the competition for 
resources even more significant, allowing the GoS to use the local dispute and invoke 
otherwise insignificant ‘Arab’ and ‘African’ differences in pursuit of its own interests 
(Hottinger, 2006). In addition to the conflict’s master cleavage, local feuds had been 
heated by the “Arab Gathering” campaign in North Africa, promoting the rise of Arabs 
above African tribes, including Arab replacement of Darfur’s Fur governor, and the 
violent threats upon the denial of the Arab domination20. Yet another destabilizing factor 
that spurred the armed rebellion in 2003 was the support of the SPLM from Southern 
Sudan. It was done in an attempt to create a second front in its war against the GoS to 
improve SPLM’s bargaining position and force Khartoum to yield more salient 
concessions (Flint & de Waal, 2005; Natsios, 2012). Ironically, the SPLM rebellion in 
Southern Sudan was the model of winning at the negotiation table with the support and 
pressure of the international community, rather than through battlefield victories, that the 
Darfurian rebels pursued to follow from the beginning21.  
Relatively cohesive from the early on, with only two movements and two different 
ideological platforms, the rebel movement in Darfur achieved unexpected success within 
the first nine months of the rebellion. Of thirty-eight battles, rebels won thirty-four, 
leaving National Islamic Front (NIF) forces, internally in turmoil and under pressure to 
end the North-South conflict, victorious in only four (Dagne & Everett, 2004; Gramizzi 
& Tubiana, 2012; Natsios, 2012; Tanner & Tubiana, 2007). However, their success did 
not last long. What followed was a constant reconfiguration and realignment of the 
tribes. Such realignment was not grounded in significant political disagreements. Personal 
rivalries and inept, chaotic and violent leadership largely served as the basis for infighting 
and movement fragmentation. Constant competition between the aggressive younger 
                                            
20 Often referred to as “Arab Supremacy” (Natsios, 2012) 
21 The rebellion in Darfur was indeed similar to the one in Southern Sudan in its grievances, the 
demanded reforms, violent response and the ‘divide-and-rule’ strategy of Khartoum, as well as the allies 
from neighboring countries and international attention. 
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rebels in their twenties with little combat experience and older rebel commanders 
previously trained in military tactics by the SAF (Natsios, 2012) also contributed to the 
problem. Fragmentation of the rebel movement, particularly along ethnic lines, became 
especially evident after the GoS and one of the factions of the SLM groups signed the 
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006 (Campbell, 2008; Gramizzi & Tubiana, 
2012; Tanner & Tubiana, 2007). Continued fighting was from now on characterized not 
only by ‘Arab’ versus ‘African’ disputes, but also ‘Arab’ versus ‘Arab’, as well as rebels 
against the NIF. The two groups – JEM and SLM-Walid – having refused to sign the deal 
in 2006, continued fighting the government, as well as each other, leading many 
commanders to defect and form their own militias (Gramizzi & Tubiana, 2012). At one 
point in time the rebel movement in Darfur consisted of 27 rebel groups, all claiming 
legitimacy as the representatives of Darfur numerous communities (Campbell, 2008; 
Natsios, 2012). During the North-South negotiations, Darfur rebel groups pressed to be 
included in the talks, given the similar nature of their grievances and demands. Having 
been allowed to participate on the condition of uniting with the SPLM22, however, they 
refused, wishing to keep their independence (Natsios, 2012). 
There was another factor that promoted further fragmentation among the numerous 
rebel groups in Darfur. The internationalization of Darfur’s struggle has, on the one 
hand, reduced Khartoums’ ability to use brutal force, a tactic it had previously mastered 
during other uprisings, including the civil war in the south. On the other hand, by making 
maximalist demands at the expense of addressing the conflict’s master cleavage, the 
movement substituted local legitimacy for international connections, lowering the 
barriers of entry for new rebel groups and, therefore, promoting fragmentation 23 
(Jumbert & Lanz, 2013). 
However, closer to 2008 the GoS continued to inflict violence, yet not only upon the 
African militias, but the Arab groups as well. Previously loyal Janjawiids became more 
reluctant to fight on behalf of Khartoum, thus forcing it to switch to the counter-
insurgency strategy, exploiting the grievances between the different African tribes. Such a 
tactic, in turn, ignited the cycles of extreme violence that erupted later in 2010. The 
infighting further weakened the already fragmented and militarily (as well as politically) 
anemic movement, forcing it to coordinate and form alliances in order to survive 
(Gramizzi & Tubiana, 2012). Given the gross human rights violations and protracted 
                                            
22 Garang was convinced by the previous experience with Khartoum that the only way to achieve serious 
concessions was to negotiate from a united position not to allow the GoS an opportunity to manipulate 
one faction against another (Natsios, 2012). 
23 The internationalization of Darfur’s problems and international attempts to foster unity caused the 
proliferation of what was been later coined “hotel rebels”, who lived off the per diem in fancy hotels, 
travelling from one negotiation location to another, thus making fragmentation attractive for personal 
gains. 
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violence in Darfur caused by the third rebellion, the international community made 
numerous efforts to unite the movement for the sake of reaching an enforceable 
negotiated agreement, unlike the DPA signed in 2006. The result of these efforts was the 
creation of an umbrella organization – Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM)24 – for 
the purpose of negotiating more flexibly in Doha, Qatar (Flint, 2010; Sørbø & Ahmed, 
2013). The major trend towards unification, however, came in 2010 with the return of 
SLA-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM), the sole signatory to the 2006 DPA. Minni, having been 
promised numerous benefits, yet being dissatisfied with the loss of political influence, 
relevance and territory, brought with him troops and allowed for the splinter group 
leaders from other factions originally part of SLA and JEM to join (Gramizzi & Tubiana, 
2012). His decision to leave the government might have been brought on by the 
aftermath of the 2010 elections in Sudan. However, it is likely that the pressure from the 
government to integrate his troops into the SAF, the key to implementing the DPA 
security arrangement (while no other part of the agreement was being implemented) was 
the major reason for rejoining the rebels (Williams & Simpson, 2011).  
Having started yet another fragmentation during the talks in Doha, LJM became the sole 
signatory of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) on 14 July 2011. JEM, 
having suffered numerous defections as well, remained relatively cohesive throughout the 
talks and later aligned with SPLM-N (particularly involving military coordination in South 
Kordofan) in yet another attempt to remain cohesive (Gramizzi & Tubiana, 2012). 
Having signed a separate Framework and Ceasefire Agreement (JEM Framework) in 
February 2010, it set up the roadmap for future negotiations with the GoS (Williams & 
Simpson, 2011). Although the progression from extremely fragmented to relatively 
cohesive is evident in the case of Darfur rebels, the level of cohesion at the moment of 
negotiations and the signing of numerous different agreements was low. Such a pattern 
allows for a thorough analysis of the effects of fragmentation on the types of concessions 
fragmented movements receive during negotiations. 
Negotiated Peace: Dream or Reality? 
From early 2005, after the insurgency in Darfur suffered from a serious military response 
from the GoS, a military victory by either side was highly unlikely. The SAF weren’t 
trained to fight insurgency, as Khartoum had repeatedly relied on the divide-and-rule 
tactic in dealing with other civil wars. The rebels were too divided to represent a serious 
challenger to the government. The importance of a political settlement, not a battlefield 
victory, was therefore obvious, especially to those from the outside attempting to meddle 
                                            
24 By April 2010, LJM was already joined by a number of predominantly Fur rebel factions, previously 
affiliated with SLM-United; SLA-Abdel Shafi and SLM-Unity (Williams & Simpson, 2011).  
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in the conflict and lend a helping hand in its resolution. However, under the supervision 
of American, African and European diplomats, the first three efforts, alongside 
humanitarian intervention, to initiate a peace process in Darfur failed (Natsios, 2012). 
Although no direct approval from the international community was received, Darfurians’ 
strife for self-determination and a more democratic state earned the rebel movement 
international attention and respect, and shifted the international bias in their favor (Sørbø 
& Ahmed, 2013). Severe humanitarian crisis and the realization of the necessity to unite 
the numerous rebel groups, led the outside interveners to foster cooperation through 
trying to bring all the factions together at conferences all around the world. The necessity 
became especially evident after a failed attempt to sign a Darfur Peace Agreement in 
2006. Having succeeded in creating a relatively cohesive LJM umbrella group, another 
attempt at negotiation a solution was made in Doha in 2009-2011, the outcomes of 
which have been more than inconclusive. This section analyses the two major agreements 
that attempted to bring peace to Darfur, and how fragmentation affected the types of 
agreements that were eventually signed. Both agreements were widely characterized by 
exclusion and inter-rebel divisions, and none has been satisfactorily implemented. 
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of 2006 
5 May 2006 was the day the first attempt at a politically negotiated agreement to end the 
conflict in Darfur failed. The agreement, negotiated with numerous rebel factions, 
including the most significant faction at the time – JEM – was signed, however only by 
one faction of SLA, the one under the leadership of Minni Minnawi. The agreement 
stipulated that its signatories would receive the fourth highest position within the national 
government of Sudan, and the new transitional authority, whose chairperson would serve 
as the Senior Assistant to the President, was to be established in Darfur. In addition, 
power-sharing arrangements included twelve seats in the National Assembly. On the 
state level (Darfur was at the moment divided into three states), the rebels would receive 
the positions of one of the three governors, two of eight state ministers in each state and 
the deputy governor of each other state. Numerous other small details as to the 
distribution of votes and commissioners were included in the agreement, alongside with 
the promise of a referendum to decide on the whether to establish a single government 
for the Darfur region, uniting the three existing states, or to leave the current status quo. 
The wealth-sharing section of the agreement included the monetary contribution by the 
Government of National Unity (GNU) to Darfur in a form of reconstruction and 
development (Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund). However, the agreement 
lacked the greater financial commitment to compensate the victims in Darfur, and more 
specific and clear-cut promise of wealth transfer from Khartoum (International Crisis 
Group, 2007). Lastly, the security arrangements included the integration of rebel armies 
into the Sudanese army and other security institutions, with the signatories’ leaders 
represented in the leadership positions of the SAF. Having been negotiated on the last 
days of bargaining, the proposed security arrangements did not satisfy the JEM and the 
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SLA. The reasons for dissatisfaction were the vagueness on the implementation, 
insignificant role in the security institutions and the lack of guarantees that the militias, 
affiliated with the government and involved in regular violent attacks on the rebel 
movement, such as Janjaweed, would effectively disarm (Hottinger, 2006). The non-
signatory parties were also opposed to the possibility of maintaining the status quo of the 
three states, demanding the unification of Darfur into a single region. The reasons for 
such demands lay in the political weight of the region being lessened by the division, as 
the territory occupied 20% of Sudan’s overall area, yet constituted only 2 out of 25 
Sudanese states. On top of that, the rebels wanted to have the third highest position in 
the national government, that of Vice-President, and more representation in the state and 
federal structures. 
On paper, the agreement constituted an admirable effort to resolve the conflict 
politically. However, many (including the negotiation participants) claimed the effort 
wasn’t sincere and the government was not intent on implementing all the provisions of 
the agreement except for the parts that made the rebel groups militarily weaker and 
unable to challenge the government. One of the leaders of the SLA, Abdul Wahid Nur, 
publicly announced, upon the advice of numerous advocacy groups, his refusal to sign 
the agreement, and then indeed did not sign the document. (Natsios, 2012). Many 
claimed that due to the internal divisions within the SLA, should one leader sign the 
agreement, the other would definitely not (Tanner & Tubiana, 2007), thus ensuring the 
agreement was insignificant. In rejecting the agreement, the non-signatory groups argued 
that the protocols on wealth and power sharing did not adequately address the conflict’s 
root causes, while the proposed security arrangements severely limited their direct 
participation (Sørbø & Ahmed, 2013). Aspiring to achieve the CPA of their own, the 
Darfur rebels were severely limited by the provisions in CPA regarding the power 
distribution between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM. Moreover, the 
DPA did not represent a truly negotiated agreement. The parties made no efforts to 
accommodate and forge common ground; neither did they attempt to collaboratively 
solve the problem. While trading accusations and reiterating their own demands, the 
parties were striving to gain military advantage over each other, thus using negotiations as 
a smoke-screen (Nathan, 2006). Internal divisions within the rebels constituted one of the 
largest obstacles to improving their bargaining position. 
The agreement, even though only signed by one group, effectively neutralized that group, 
making it politically and militarily irrelevant in the competition for power. In return for 
his signature, Minni Minawi, in accordance with the agreement, became the Senior 
Assistant to the Sudanese President, which in theory made him the fourth highest 
executive in Sudan. In a place where public office represents a source of income as it 
does in Sudan, this position reflects the characteristics of a private good and serves as a 
payoff for the commander of one of the numerous divided factions of the movement 
(H1). Minni represented only 10% of the population of Darfur and was aware that the 
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other groups would not sign the deal, thus making the payoff logic more obvious. 
Moreover, following the DPA, Minni received munitions, weapons, and vehicles from 
the GoS (Tanner & Tubiana, 2007), all of which represent the goods that can be used for 
private gains (H1).  During the negotiations, a groups of six non-Fur Abdel-Wahid 
delegates signed the DPA, however not aligning themselves with Minni, bur rather 
through forming the Front for Liberation and Rebirth, a group affiliated with the GoS 
and largely sponsored by it (Tanner & Tubiana, 2007). Being politically inconsequential, 
the group simply serves to demonstrate the importance of personal payoffs exercised by 
the GoS as a negotiation tactic. 
Other provisions of the agreement can also be characterized as payoffs, providing 
sufficient evidence for the first hypothesis (H1). Such provisions include the security 
arrangements that clearly benefitted the GoS over the rebels, yet provided selected rebel 
leaders with high-ranking positions. Another example is the establishment of the 
commission to oversee the wealth transfer from Khartoum in a country coined with 
corruption and the lack of accountable institutions. Yet another provision, the 
referendum on the status of Darfur, demands a more detailed inspection. In comparison 
with the referendum on independence in Southern Sudan, which is clearly excludable to 
the citizens of Southern Sudan, yet can be enjoyed by everyone without restrictions to 
any other member of the club, the referendum of Darfur’s status reflected different 
characteristics. Given the inevitable dependability of the region on Khartoum regardless 
of Darfur’s status, any resources directed into the region would have to be shared with 
the citizens of Sudan currently residing in Darfur. Provided that residency is a fluid 
notion, and that border control is inapplicable within a country regardless of how many 
regions it is comprised of, anyone willing to enjoy the resources of the Darfur region (be 
it one or three states) could potentially come and enjoy them, making the good rivalrous. 
In addition, due to the lack of excludability of the good to the Darfurians, the promised 
referendum falls under the common good category. Moreover, provided that the 
referendum would only affect the weight of political representation of the Darfurians, it 
would either increase or leave the amount of private benefits the representatives could 
derive from the high positions in the public office the same, essentially not changing the 
situation on the ground. The whole agreement, therefore, provides plenty of evidence to 
support the argument that the more internally fragmented to movement is, the more 
(although not completely) the concessions the rebels in the movement receive reflect the 
characteristics of a private good (H1). 
The Doha Agreement 
The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) represents the latest attempt of the 
GoS and the rebel groups to achieve peace through political channels. Having been 
signed by the GoS and the newly formed umbrella group – the LJM – on 14 July 2011, 
the agreement has already been violated through the use of violence and lack of 
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implementation. According to the UN reports, violence has persisted and the number of 
internally displaced people as a result of such violence is increasing by the hour. Although 
attempts were made to include the two most politically and militarily relevant rebel 
groups, the LJM and the JEM, into the agreement, the JEM did not sign the agreement. 
The refusal to sign it once again demonstrated how divided the Darfur rebel movement 
has been from the very beginning up until today. Given the stronger negotiating position 
of the government, it was not going to yield more concessions, or even the equivalent of 
what it had previously offered at it weakest point in 2006, thus significantly limiting the 
range of possible agreements (Sørbø & Ahmed, 2013).  
While the JEM had previously signed an agreement with the GoS in 2009, the agreement 
fell apart due to the lack of trust between the parties and actual support for the 
agreement, rendering the agreement insignificant for the purposes of this study (Natsios, 
2012). However, the significance of the JEM framework was in that it fostered, albeit 
limited, alliance formation between the Fur factions. It did so by creating the sense of 
urgency for other movements and the feeling of a closing window of opportunity with 
the need to present a united front. Thus, only hours before the JEM signing ceremony 
the LJM was created (Williams & Simpson, 2011). Some argue that it the JEM framework 
represented the GoS attempt to influence the 2010 elections through signing an 
agreement that would guarantee the cessation of hostilities and allow for the elections to 
take place. Any more substantial proposals by the Darfurian rebels were rejected or 
postponed, as Khartoum had no intention of making any progress with the 
comprehensive negotiations, hoping for an alternative set of Darfurian negotiation 
partners after the elections (Enough Project, 2010). This hope, however, was never 
fulfilled. 
Although currently signed by only one rebel group, the mediators of the Doha talks 
intended for the DDPD to be signed by all rebel groups later on. However, at the time of 
the writing, this intent has not been fulfilled. The provisions of the DDPD include the 
creation of a compensation fund for the victims as a part of quite vaguely formulated 
wealth-sharing arrangements, appointment of the Darfurian Vice-President, 
establishment of the new Darfur Regional Authority, further representation at the 
national and regional levels, and a referendum on the permanent status of Darfur within 
Sudan. While not an addition to the DPA, the DDPD did not serve as a substitute for it 
either, thus binding the new signatory group to an agreement, parts of which were already 
promised to the JEM earlier in 2006. In addition, the agreement provided for the rebel 
group army integration into the SAF. In essence, there was not much truly significant 
difference between the DPA, which after being signed was repeatedly violated and never 
completely implemented, and the DDPD, the implementation of which is rather 
questionable to this day. The agreement without a doubt reflects the much stronger 
position of the GoS, and the lack of salient concessions on its part. The major difference 
in the outside factors, however, is that in 2006, both the GoS and the rebel movement 
  
 
37 
Divide et Impera? 
 
were limited in their options for addressing the conflict’s root causes due to the 
provisions of CPA, thus rendering any demands for complete autonomy or 
independence impossible to achieve. At the time of negotiations over the DDPD, 
however, South Sudan had already voted for the establishment of an independent South 
Sudan, thus illuminating any daunting prospects of another conflict becoming violent 
over the agreement should political rearrangement at the national level appear on the 
agenda. 
Like most of the DPA, many of the relevant provision in the DDPD reflect the 
characteristics of a private good. Such provision include the establishment of a 
compensation fund, nomination of a Darfurian Vice-President and a number of high 
ranking position in the public office on the national and regional levels. The 
establishment of a regional authority reflects the characteristics of a private and club 
good at the same time. The promise of a referendum, however, represents a common 
good, the same way it did in the DPA. All in all, the high movement fragmentation, 
which is characteristic of the Darfur rebel movement throughout the conflict, has 
significantly affected the types of concessions the rebels were able to receive from the 
GoS. Most of the concessions discussed above represent the features of private goods, 
thus supporting the first hypothesis (H1). 
Conclusion 
The case of Darfur represents a textbook example of rebel movement fragmentation, and 
provides sufficient evidence in support of H1. As demonstrated by the agreements 
analyzed, the fragmented opposition, while unable to extract salient concessions 
reflecting club goods characteristics, was successful in receiving payoffs from the 
government on numerous occasions. On average, the concessions received by the 
fragmented groups addressed neither the conflict’s master cleavage, nor its underlying 
causes. When it did, the agreements were never implemented, and there is enough 
evidence to suggest they were deliberately intended so. The frequent financial 
contributions from the GoS to the rebel leaders, however, make the case of Darfur a 
perfect example of H1 of this study. 
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VII. Cross-Case Comparison And Alternative Explanations 
In the preceding sections, two different cases that illustrate the variation on the 
independent variable – fragmentation – under research in this study were presented. The 
case studies of Southern Sudan and Darfur provide observable support for both of the 
hypotheses, which is illustrates with a brief cross-case comparison below. 
The Logic of Payoffs 
H1: The more fragmented the rebel movement is, the more the concessions made by the incumbent 
government will be rivalrous and excludable in nature, therefore reflecting the characteristics of a private 
good. 
Both cases provide sufficient support for the argument that more fragmented 
movements tend to receive payoffs in a form of private goods during the peace 
negotiations. The Darfur rebel movement remains fragmented until today, offering more 
substantive evidence in support of the claim. Early negotiation attempts with the 
Southern Sudan movement also prove the trend. It becomes clear from both cases that 
there are several mechanisms that translate fragmentation into private goods as 
concessions. Such are the weakness of the movement’s negotiating position, the 
multitude of contestants for the lucrative positions of power and government’s ambition 
to neutralize the contestants by discrediting them through GoS affiliation. Abuja talks, 
the Khartoum agreement, the DPA and the DDPD all portray the way of individual 
ambitions and pursuit of personal gains trumping the shared movement goals when given 
the choice of a more artificial agreement with private benefits over no agreement 
whatsoever. In other words, it demonstrates the payoffs to the individual rebel group 
members directly or indirectly through the wealth and power-sharing arrangements. All 
analyzed agreements, with an exception of the CPA, fail to truly address the conflicts’ 
master cleavages, regardless of their nature. In numerous cases, such as the Khartoum 
agreement, the DPA and the DDPD, the government’s logic was based on the idea of 
neutralizing the rebel factions by affiliating them with the GoS with no intention of 
implementing any political arrangements after the agreements were signed. The 
concessions, therefore, served as payoffs to the rebel leaders for their intentional 
affiliation with the GoS. Upon signing of all three agreements, the rebel armies (the most 
essential tool in contesting the government) were either officially incorporated into the 
GoS forces, or, through the provision of necessary equipment and ammunition, became 
their extensions by default. By signing the agreements the signatories became puppets in 
the hands of the central government, dependent on it for military support, thus rendering 
themselves politically irrelevant. The government was able to minimize the cost of 
fighting the conflict through the creation of proxies to fight on its behalf. In addition, as 
proven by the aftermath of the agreements, the government deliberately never 
implemented any of the provisions representing salient concessions on its behalf.  
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 Other research outlined earlier in this study suggests some possible alternative factors 
that could explain the pattern. While commitment, credible guarantee and spoilers 
problems (K. G. Cunningham, 2011; Driscoll, 2012; Fearon & Laitin, 2007; Furtado, 
2007; Nygard & Weintraub, Forthcoming) do explain the reluctance to sign a more 
comprehensive agreement addressing the conflict’s causes, they fail to explain the logic 
behind signing the agreements that clearly benefitted the rebel leaders over the 
movement goals. The existence of veto players (D. E. Cunningham, 2006), and their 
importance are only consistent with the findings on the conclusion of the agreement 
itself, not its nature and contents. The government’s logic behind the use of the divide-
and-rule tactic is consistent with logic of “wining away pieces”: Khartoum kept paying 
off the smaller rebel groups in order to neutralize them as viable contesters for power 
(Johnston, 2007). However, when examined alongside the fact that the GoS often created 
the smaller militias itself, the logic looses its explanatory value. 
Another factor – international pressure – that might seem to serve as an alternative 
explanations for the types of concessions the movements would receive in negotiations 
also fail to explain this pattern. The amount of international attention and pressure on 
the GoS to stop the violence and negotiate peace agreements in both Southern Sudan 
and Darfur was relatively at the same level. Such pressure should have resulted in more 
comprehensive agreements addressing the conflicts’ master cleavages and followed by the 
agreement implementation. Moreover, factors like the allegations of genocide, the 
issuance of the ICC warrant for the arrest of the Sudanese president, the general global 
recognition of the right to self-determination and sympathy to the Darfurian population 
and cause should have influences the process of negotiations. The Darfur insurgents, 
according to this logic, should have received much more salient concessions reflecting 
the characteristics of club goods and addressing the conflict’s master cleavage. However, 
the reality proves otherwise. Therefore, the significance of rebel fragmentation for the 
types of concession they are able to extract during the negotiations is further 
strengthened, while the alternative explanation fails to provide a viable description of the 
pattern. 
The Logic of Conceding  
H2: The more cohesive the rebel movement is, the more the concessions made by the incumbent 
government will be excludable, yet non-rivalrous in nature, therefore reflecting the characteristics of a club 
good. 
The case of Southern Sudanese CPA provides sufficient evidence in support of this 
hypothesis. Although all attempts to negotiate a peace agreement prior to the CPA were 
characterized by the payoffs and failed attempts to stop the violence on account of rebel 
movement fragmentation, the CPA provisions, for the most part, represent the 
characteristics of club goods. The mechanism at work here is the popular support of the 
movement by its constituents and its increased military capacity, transformed into 
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bargaining power at the negotiation table, as predicted by previous scholarly inquiry (D. 
E. Cunningham, 2006; Nygard & Weintraub, Forthcoming). The SPLM included of all 
the previously rivalrous rebel groups into one politically and militarily significant faction 
through the pulling of resources and identifying a shared goal. It was further able to 
avoid the potential spoilers problem, thus guaranteeing the SPLM’s commitment to the 
cessation of hostilities and the CPA implementation. 
Although alternative explanations might be somewhat satisfactory, they cannot fully 
account for the club good characteristics of the concessions yielded by the GoS in 
negotiations. The international pressure, especially that of the US offering the “carrot” of 
taking Sudan off the terrorism-affiliated countries list, could have affected the decision of 
the GoS to negotiate and satisfy more of the SPLM’s demands. However, provided that 
similar international pressure existed prior to the CPA negotiations and later on during 
the conflict in Darfur, yet did not yield the same results, its relevance is seen to be 
insignificant in comparison with that of the movement’s cohesion.  
Another alternative factor potentially contributing to the explanation of the signing the 
CPA by both parties is the increased violence in Darfur and Khartoum’s urge to settle 
the Southern problem in order to “free up resources to ensure societal control” in the 
rest of Sudan (Verhoeven, 2013: 120). While partially accountable for the signing of the 
agreement per se, the resource argument fails to explain the club good characteristics of 
the GoS’ concessions. The Southern problem, apart from taking up quite a considerable 
area of Sudanese territory, was also associated with the oil-rich fields, from which 
Khartoum had been receiving benefits, albeit disturbed by the military activities, prior to 
the agreement. The government, therefore, would only be willing to negotiate with the 
South, provided that the solution of the Darfur crisis would be much less costly due to 
the lack of oil resources, if the movement was military strong and no military victory was 
possible. The strength of the SPLM movement is largely associated with it cohesion, 
therefore providing support to the cohesion argument presented in this research. As 
predicted by other research, a unitary group was indeed more likely to achieve an 
agreement addressing the conflict’s master cleavage (K. G. Cunningham, 2011). 
The last alternative factor that could have had an impact on the GoS’ willingness to grant 
the salient concessions of the club good nature is the oil exploitation in Sudan, and its 
dependency on the Southern Sudanese oil fields. Indeed, the government would be 
willing to resolve the issues in the South preventing it from fully controlling the oil fields, 
thus granting more concessions on other issues at the table. However, in negotiating the 
distribution of oil-related benefits, the government agreed to grant the GoSS 50% of the 
revenues (Tellnes, 2006), constituting a very large amount that had not been predicted by 
the mediators. Moreover, the agreement on a referendum after the interim period itself 
increased the risk for the GoS of loosing all the oil fields upon Southern Sudan’s 
succession. Therefore, while the oil fields exploitation was definitely one of the factors 
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 that affected the GoS willingness to achieve an agreement fast, it does not account for 
the types of concession the GoS yielded in the negotiations themselves. 
In general, the findings of the case studies analyzed above are consistent with the 
predicted logic. Moreover, while previous studies fail to provide entirely satisfactory 
explanations of the mechanisms that lead from the movement fragmentation to the types 
of concessions it is able to receive during negotiations, the findings are in line with their 
predictions on accounts of why fragmentation happens, why agreements with fragmented 
groups are hard to achieve and how fragmentation is often used as a counterinsurgency 
tactic (Furtado, 2007).  
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 VIII. Conclusion 
Fragmentation is an inevitable dynamic of many, if not most, civil wars. The findings 
above contribute to understanding the consequences fragmentation has on the peace 
negotiations, specifically its effects on the bargaining strength of the movement and its 
ability to extract concessions of a certain kind. As predicted, the more fragmented 
movements were found to be able to receive concessions of private nature as a means of 
paying off the rebel leaders in an attempt to neutralize them as contesters for power. 
More cohesive movements, however, achieved significantly more autonomy through 
extracting concessions with the characteristics of a club good. Such findings suggest that 
fragmentation has a negative effect on the attainment of a viable peace agreement that is 
aimed at ending the conflict and resolving its underlying issues. Policy and research 
implications of these findings are undeniable. 
First, the findings suggest that rebel fragmentation has a significant negative effect on the 
ability of the overall movement to achieve the goals, which serve to address the 
underlying causes of the conflict. Fragmentation leads to the ability of the government to 
neutralize the threat of rebel challengers for power through the offers of financial and 
other inducements associated with the private gains for the rebel leaders. The findings 
also suggest a prominent role such understanding of the fragmentation effects plays in 
the incumbent government’s strategies towards dealing with the rebellions. The 
consistent and prevailing tactic of divide-and-rule has been exercised by Khartoum for 
decades in both Darfur and Southern Sudan. The tactic seems to have produced the 
desired results in the case of Darfur, keeping the movement fragmented and weak, 
unable to extract truly salient concessions that address the conflict’s master cleavage. 
However, the use of similar tactics in Southern Sudan failed to produce the same results, 
leaving the dilemma to be investigated within the framework of future research.  
Secondly, this research indicates the strong association of rebel movement cohesion with 
its ability to achieve the goals of exercising the right of self-determination and other gains 
reflecting the characteristics of a club good. Cohesion strengthens the movement’s 
bargaining position and reduces the potential spoilers-associated uncertainty about the 
implementation phase. It, therefore, fosters the movement to achieve more than a 
fragmented movement dealing with the similar counterinsurgency response would. This 
has important policy implications for the incumbent state in it attempts to maintain or 
restore its territorial integrity, and in managing its expectation in relation to the peace 
negotiations. However, the concessions in any agreement cannot be analyzed outside of 
the context in which they are made and the parties they involve, thus implying the 
potential importance of international pressure on not only the negotiations, but also the 
rebel movement fragmentation itself. 
Thirdly, this study contributes to the understanding of the violent behavior of the rebels, 
and especially the motives behind it. Findings suggest that the levels of fragmentation 
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 and violence are positively correlated. Due to the zero-sum nature of political relevance 
and economic gains, including those from the international community, fragmentation 
becomes alluring as the barriers to entry the rebellion become less and less significant. 
With such multitude of violent actors, concessions that serve as payoffs are used as 
negotiation tools, rather than a conflict-resolution mechanism. The policy implications of 
this finding, supported by previous research, are indisputably significant. 
The case studies of Darfur and Southern Sudan in their strive for self-determination 
indeed provide compelling evidence demonstrating the effect of fragmentation on the 
types of concessions rebel movements receive during the peace negotiations. The cases 
also demonstrate the dynamic nature of fragmentation and its negative effects on the 
civilian population, in line with the results of the previous scholarly inquiry. However, no 
firm conclusions can be made on just these two cases positioned in the same Sudanese 
context. Future research on the effects of rebel fragmentation on peace negotiations has 
to examine a broader range of cases to test whether the findings of this study hold under 
different conditions. 
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